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Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3 (Feb. 04, 2010)1
 
 




 Reverse and remand of the trial court’s affirmation to the question of whether parents 
can, by stipulation, eliminate or abridge a trial court’s statutory authority to review and modify a 




  The Court answered the question in the negative concluding that modification statutes 
NRS 125B.145(4), NRS 125B.070, and NRS 125B.080 apply to appeals to review and modify 
child support orders. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Anthony Fernandez, appellant, and Jennifer Fernandez, respondent, had two children 
prior to the court granting their joint petition for divorce in August 1998.  
 The original divorce decree awarded the parents joint legal custody of the children, 
giving primary physical custody to the mother.  The decree obligated the father to pay child 
support of $3,000 per month.  While the decree stated the child support was “consistent with the 
provisions of NRS 125B.070,” it actually exceeded NRS 125B.070’s presumptive maximum.2
 In July 1999, the trial court approved an increase in the father’s monthly child support 
obligations from $3,000 to $4,000.   
 
 In June 2000, the court approved a new stipulation between the parents.  This stipulation 
provided for joint physical custody in both parents.  While this stipulation left the amount of 
child support obligations unchanged, it also purportedly made the child support obligation 
nonmodifiable, stating that both parties “voluntarily waive any right they may have pursuant to 
Chapter 125 B of the Nevada Revised Statutes to seek a modification to [father’s] child support 
obligations to [mother].”   
 In 2007, the father’s child support obligations amounted to $80,000 a year.  From 1995-
2001 the father earned sums ranging from $500,000 to more than $4,000,000.  However, high 
losses in the market in 2002 led to his inability to trade at his prior high levels and by 2007 he no 
longer traded and was earning only $3,000 a month selling cars.   
In 2007, the father filed the motion to modify underlying this appeal.  At this time both 
he and the mother had roughly equal passive and earned income.3
                                                 
1 By Jennifer Shrum 
 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.070 (2009) and  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.080 (2009) set presumptive limits on child 
support keyed to the number of children and the obligor parent’s gross monthly income, with a $100 minimum and 
$800 maximum per child per month, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index. 
3 At this time the father and mother each separately had an additional child to support. 
The trial court declined to review the father’s motion under NRS 125B.145.  Instead, the 
trial court ordered a limited hearing to address whether the waiver made the child support order 
nonmodifiable. 
 The trial court denied the father’s motion to modify, holding that “the child support 
provisions of the [decree and its stipulated modifications] shall not be disturbed by the Court 
based upon the waivers of the parties set forth therein and upon the fact that [the father] still has 
the ability to pay said amount from his currently held assets.”  The trial court further stated that 
“the Court is not bound by the provisions of NRS 125B.145 where the parties have previously 
agreed in a stipulation and order modifying the Decree of Divorce that neither party will seek 
modification of child support.” 
 The father appealed.  The Eight Judicial District Court addressed the question of whether 
parents can, by stipulation, eliminate or abridge a trial court’s statutory authority to review and 
modify a child support order.  The mother maintained that the parties’ agreement to 
nonmodifiable child support should be upheld as a matter of contract law and equity, based on 
her part performance.  The father asserted that when the parties incorporated the support 
agreement into the decree, it ceased being a matter of private contract and became a judicially 
imposed obligation, at which point the statutory modification provisions of NRS 125B.070 and 
NRS 125B.080 apply, notwithstanding the parties’ agreement to the contrary.  Relying on NRS 
125B.145(1)(b), the father urged that the award should have been modified to conform to the 
formulas in NRS 125B.070 and NRS 125B.080 without regard to changed circumstances, since 
more than three years had passed since the award’s last review; failing that he urged that he 




 While Nevada’s child support statutes do not directly address whether parents can 
stipulate to a nonmodifiable child support order, Nevada’s child support statutes establish that 
child support involves more than private contract.   
 
I. Child Support Orders 
 
 The trial court has continuing jurisdiction over its child support orders.4 In 2003 NRS 
125B.145(4) was clarified stating that “[a]n order for the support of a child may be reviewed at 
any time on the basis of changed circumstances.”5  Further, a change of 20 percent or more in a 
child support obligor’s gross monthly income “shall be deemed to constitute changed 
circumstances requiring a review for modification of the order for the support of the child.”6  
Upon the request of the parent or legal guardian, “[a]n order for the support of a child must . . . 
be reviewed by the court at least every 3 years . . . to determine whether the order should be 
modified or adjusted.”7
                                                 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.510(1)(b) states that once a trial court determines custody it may “[a]t any time modify or 
vacate” its support and custody orders.   
  Finally, “[i]f the court . . . [h]as jurisdiction to modify the order and, 
taking into account the best interests of the child determines that modification or adjustment of 
5 Id. § 125B.145. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. § 125B.145(1)(b). 
the order is appropriate, the court shall enter an order modifying or adjusting the previous order 




II. Child Support Order Modifications 
  
The Court stated that had the Legislature wanted to give parents the option of agreement 
to a decree providing for nonmodifiable child support, it could have easily provided an exception 
to NRS 125B.145.9
 The mother argued that public policy supports nonmodification agreements when applied 
to preclude downward modification, no matter the impact on the obligor parent, reasoning that 
more support will always serve the child’s best interest.  The Court found that neither Nevada 
statutes nor public policy supports this argument. The formula and guideline statutes intend child 
support payments to meet the child’s needs, to be fair to both parents, and to be met without 
impoverishing the obligor parent.
 Currently, Nevada’s child support modification statutes say nothing about 
parental agreements. Thus, the Court stated, public policy prevents a court from enforcing a 
purportedly nonmodifiable child support order, even if the parties stipulate to it.   
10
 The Court also stated that when agreed-upon support is incorporated into a decree, it 
becomes a court order.  Court-ordered child support is not a fixed obligation but is subject to 
readjustment as circumstances may direct.
 
11  The Court found that the trial court failed to follow 
the statutes as written when it justified its decision by stating that the father still had assets he 
could use to pay child support, even if the support obligation exceeded his gross income.  The 
trial court’s test resembled more closely the “undue hardship” standard in the enforcement 
statutes, than the changed circumstance standard in the modifications statutes.12
 The Court concluded that the trial court erred in declaring the modification statutes not 
applicable to the father’s motion and reversed and remanded for proceedings under NRS 
125B.145(4), NRS 125B.070, and NRS 125B.080.   
 
 
III. The Mother’s Part Performance. 
  
The mother maintained that her part performance of the nonmodifiabiltiy stipulation 
estopped the father from contesting enforceability.  The Court found that the stipulation waiving 
modification rights was entered after the property settlement between the parties was concluded 
and the support obligations were set.  The Court concluded that estoppel is not available to 
resurrect the contract right that public policy invalidates.13
 
 
IV. Scope of Proceedings on Remand 
                                                 
8 Id. § 125B.145(2)(b). 
9 See Amodio v. Amodio, 56 Conn. App. 459, 471, 743 A.2d 1135, 1143 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (discussing  CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 46b-86(a) , which provides for modification based on changed circumstances “unless and to the extent 
the decree precludes modification”).  
10 See Barbagallo v. Barbagallo, 105 Nev. 546, 551, 779 P.2d 532, 536 (1989) (“[w]hat really matters...is whether 
the children are being taken care of as well as possible under the financial circumstances in which the two parents 
find themselves.”). 
11 Riemer v. Riemer, 73 Nev. 197, 199, 314 P.2d 381, 383 (1957). 
12 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.140(c)(2). 
13 Krieman v. Goldberg, 214 Wis. 2d 163, 177, 571 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
 
The Court stated that in order for the father to prevail on his modification motion on remand, 
the father must demonstrate changed circumstances.14
 
  The Court differentiated between the 
custody setting, in which NRS 125.480(1) makes the best interest of the child “the sole 
consideration,” and the support setting in which the parents’ and the child’s best interest are 
interwoven.   
Conclusion 
 So long as the statutory criteria for modification are met, a “trial court always has the 
power to modify an existing child support order, either upward or downward, notwithstanding 
the parties’ agreement to the contrary.”15
 
  
                                                 
14 Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. __, ___, 216 P.3d 213, 228 (2009). 
15 In re Marriage of Alter, 171 Cal. App. 4th  718, 722, 89 Cal Rptr. 3d 849, 852 (Ct. App. 2009). 
